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We investigate earnings management (EM) behaviour at failed banks by examining the 
intensity and direction of EM around FDIC-insured commercial bank failures. Our empirical 
analysis indicates that failing banks engage in EM to a significantly greater extent than non-
failing banks. Our results show that failing banks’ discretion over loan loss provisions ranges 
from aggressive (upwards EM) to conservative (downwards EM). 
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Hands in the Cookie Jar: Exploiting Loan Loss Provisions under Bank Financial Distress 
Introduction 
We investigate earnings management (EM) behaviour at failed banks. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to examine EM in the context of bank failures. Bank failures are 
expensive to resolve and costlier than non-bank failures.1 Across 2008-2014, bank resolution 
costs were estimated to average 7% of GDP in the OECD (Blix Grimaldi et al., 2016). Our 
interest is piqued because international accounting standards allow managers discretion to 
set accruals (Barth et al., 2017). Bank managers may use EM for strategic, opportunistic, or 
potentially unethical reasons; the line between ethical and unethical actions being a grey area 
that partitions legitimacy and fraud (Beatty et al., 2002).  
Understanding the behaviour of failing banks is of special interest to bank regulators charged 
with ensuring financial stability. For regulators and prospective buyers of failed bank assets, 
identification of EM behaviour pre failure could signal unethical or possibly fraudulent 
practices by management (Kaplan and Ravenscroft, 2004). EM breeds concerns over the 
quality and reliability of financial reporting. Aggressive EM can induce greater risk-taking and 
higher incidence of corporate failures. EM, therefore, can challenge bank regulatory 
objectives: minimise systemic risk, safeguard safety-net arrangements, ensure banks are 
going concerns, and protecting customers. 
Our analysis enhances understanding of EM in banking by contributing robust empirical 
evidence on the intensity and direction of EM around bank failures. We supplement research 
showing banks have used EM inter alia to smooth earnings and manage regulatory capital 
(“cookie jar reserves”), avoid losses, take bigger baths, signal private information about 
prospects, reduce tax liabilities, and increase executive pay (Ahmed et al., 1999; Beatty et al., 
2002; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Cornett et al., 2009; Huizinga and Laeven, 2012; Beatty and 
Liao, 2014; Cohen et al., 2014; Norden and Stoian, 2014; Jiang et al., 2016; Barth et al., 2017; 
Dong and Zhang, 2018).  
Loan loss provisions are the largest discretionary item in most banks’ financial statements. 
While banks manage earnings by under-provisioning (income-increasing) or over-provisioning 
(income-decreasing), failing banks face different incentives when selecting their EM strategy. 
First, intensified agency conflict could motivate aggressive under-provisioning to boost 
retained earnings and regulatory capital (Beatty and Liao, 2011; Ng and Roychowdhury, 
2014). In this scenario, upwardly manipulating income portrays banks as safer and healthier, 
enables refinancing of existing debt and/or raising new debt (Imperatore and Trombetta, 
2014), and allows managers to extract rents and/or mask their intentions by delaying release 
of bad news that could expedite bankruptcy (Beatty et al., 2002; Bergstresser and Philippon, 
2006; Beatty and Liao, 2011). This complies with conjecture that lower transparency is less 
costly as depositors have no incentive to run if there is no reason to believe the likelihood of 
 
1 James (1991) finds the realized costs of bank failures more expensive than non-banks by an amount equivalent 
to 10% of assets. Across 1986-2007, the FDIC estimated the cost to deposit insurance schemes of resolving deposit-
insured failed banks was roughly $30 billion (Bennett and Unal, 2010). 
bank failure has increased, which reduces propensity to panic (Holmstrom, 2009; Calomiris 
and Gorton, 1991).  
Second, failing banks may opt to over-provision and take bigger baths by reporting larger 
losses (Barth et al., 2017). This could reflect failing banks’ awareness of increased regulatory 
surveillance to mitigate information asymmetries (Rosner, 2003). Holod and Peek (2007) find 
greater transparency allowed public banks to issue uninsured large time deposits and lessen 
financial constraints. Additionally, banks with smaller delays in provisioning find it easier to 
replenish equity which lessens stock market illiquidity risk as information asymmetries with 
equity providers decrease (Beatty and Liao, 2011).  
The severity of 2007-09 GFC prompted heavy criticism of banks for alleged poor behaviour, 
misaligned incentives, and faulty business models (Brunnermeier, 2009; Schoen, 2017). Banks 
that chose aggressive EM pre-GFC experienced greater tail risk, larger write downs, and more 
failures during the crisis (Cohen et al., 2014). Banks were chastised for intentionally and 
unethically using complex financial instruments to obfuscate financial statements, making it 
harder for regulators, creditors, and stakeholders to accurately assess banks’ financial 
condition (Wagner, 2007; Dewally and Shao, 2013).2 By increasing opacity, EM obscures the 
nature of banks’ risk-taking (Bushman, 2014), which is concerning because bank risk-taking 
(and performance) has strong implications for the real economy. 
Evidence from non-financial firms shows ex post bankrupt firms, which ex ante do not appear 
distressed, engage in significantly greater EM than non-distressed firms before bankruptcy. 
The EM behaviour of ex post bankrupts resembles firms the SEC sanctioned for fraud (Rosner, 
2003). Deloitte’s 2008 Forensic Centre Report reports that firms entering bankruptcy were 
“three times more likely than non-bankrupt companies to face enforcement actions by the 
SEC relating to alleged financial statement fraud”. Barth et al. (2008) contend that managers 
of troubled firms perceive distress as a temporary situation to be concealed through EM until 
performance improves. Worryingly, aggressive EM behaviour shows little sign of abating. 
Methodology and Data 
Our novel setting allows us to contribute first evidence on the intensity and direction of EM 
around bank failures. We examine the EM behaviour of FDIC-insured commercial banks that 
failed (charter closed) or received regulatory assistance from the FDIC (charter survives). We 
construct our sample using Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago (1984 to 1991) and FDIC (1992 to 2017). After omitting missing data, 
the sample comprises 257,881 bank-year observations from 16,894 unique banks. We identify 
1,425 failed banks from the FDIC failed list; 1,326 were auctioned off to a succeeding charter 
and 99 received assistance. 
 
2 Criticisms prompted policy makers to prioritise reforms designed to improve the transparency of banks’ financial 
reporting. Basel-3 guidelines implore greater transparency in banks’ financial reporting and disclosure of banks’ 
financial health to external investors. New international accounting rules like IFRS 9 address specific issues with 
methods used to set loan loss provisions. 
EM implies managers apply discretion when setting accruals. In banking, the two main 
accruals are loan loss provisions (LLP) and realised securities gains or losses.3 We focus on LLP 
as the larger accrual and most applicable to smaller banks. LLP is managers’ present estimate 
of future losses from defaults on outstanding loans.4 Following Beatty et al. (2002), we 
estimate equation [1] to predict normal (expected) LLP with the residual measuring abnormal 
(unexpected) provisions:  
 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽3∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜫𝑿𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜡𝒀𝒕  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(1) 
 
Where for every bank i at time t(t-1), LLP is loan loss provisions; LLR is loan loss reserve; NPL 
is non-performing loans; CO is net charge-offs; Loans is total loans and leases; Δ indicates 
change; X is a vector of loan types (real estate, commercial and industrial, consumer, 
agricultural); Y is a vector of year dummies. All variables, bar Y, are expressed as ratios to total 
assets at t-1 and denominated in percentages. 
To determine if failed banks manage earnings more or less aggressively than non-failed banks, 
we estimate equation [2] which specifies the absolute residuals from equation [1] as 
dependent variable and a binary variable, Fail, equals unity if a bank fails the following year, 
zero otherwise, alongside other covariates: 
 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐹𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐸𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑲𝑽𝒊𝒕  + 𝜡𝒀𝒕 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡  
(2) 
 
Where for every bank i at time t(t-1), ALLP is abnormal LLP or abs(ɛit) from equation [1]; Loss 
equals unity if net income is negative, zero otherwise; EBELT is earnings before extraordinary 
items, provisions, and taxes-to-previous period total assets; Capital is the ratio of equity-to-
total assets. The vector, V, includes Size (natural log of total assets), ROA (return on assets), 
BHC (unity if a firm is a bank holding company, zero otherwise), S&L Crisis (unity for 1986-
1992, zero otherwise), GFC (unity for 2007-2010, zero otherwise), GE (unity for years when 
gubernational elections occur, zero otherwise), ΔUnemployment and ΔGDP are annual 
changes in national unemployment and GDP, respectively. 
Results 
Figure 1 shows distributions of ALLP from equation [1] for all banks (Panel A), failed banks 
(Panel B) and non-failed banks (Panel C). For failed banks, the distribution of abnormal loan 
loss provisions is platykurtic indicating that failed banks manage accruals more than non-
failed banks.  
 
3 Unrealized gains or losses on available-for-sale securities (AFS) are measured as changes in fair value and reported 
in the other comprehensive income (OCI) section of equity. On selling AFS, the related amount of holding gains or 
losses is reclassified into earnings as realized gains or losses. Between 1984 and Q1 2017, changes to accounting 
standards impacted how firms used AFS in EM (Dong and Zhang, 2018).  
4 LLP is used to adjust the loan loss reserve, a contra-asset reserve and type of regulatory capital that can absorb 
expected losses. The Basel Accords treat LLR as Tier 2 capital up to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. Definitions of 
regulatory capital can vary across jurisdictions.   
We estimate equation [2] for three dependent variables: absolute ALLP (using EM), negative 
ALLP (income-increasing EM), and positive ALLP (income-decreasing EM). In Table 1, column 
1, the dependent variable is absolute ALLP. Its positive and highly significant relationship with 
Fail shows failing banks use EM to a greater extent than non-failing banks. The coefficients on 
other covariates indicate the extent of EM is greater when banks report losses, provision more 
in previous periods, realise larger operational earnings, and are better capitalised. More 
profitable banks and banks belonging to BHCs appear in less need of EM. The extent of EM is 
inversely (positively) related to the GFC (S&L crisis), when elections occur, and when changes 
in GDP are bigger. Lastly, the extent of EM is unaffected by bank size and unemployment.  
While column 1 affirms failed banks’ EM behaviour, we cannot deduce the direction of EM; 
do failed managers pursue upwards management and/or downwards management of 
earnings? Therefore, we partition the sample by the sign of residuals from equation [1]. If ɛit 
< 0, LLP is below its predicted value which infers income-increasing, upwards EM achieved by 
under-provisioning (column 2). If ɛit > 0, LLP exceeds prediction implying income-decreasing, 
downwards EM due to over-provisioning (column 3).  
Column 2 shows a highly significant inverse relationship between the negative residuals of 
LLP and Fail. It indicates that failed banks aggressively under-provision to upwards manage 
earnings compared to non-failed under-provisioning banks. This supports views that upwards 
EM is incentivised by efforts to boost profit and regulatory capital (Beatty and Liao, 2011; Ng 
and Roychowdhury, 2014) and obfuscation (Beatty et al., 2002; Bergstresser and Philippon, 
2006; Imperatore and Trombetta, 2014). Our result is consistent with evidence of banks 
exploiting EM before and during the GFC: by timing asset write-downs such that they differed 
from actual losses (Vyas, 2011); by overstating book values of assets by avoiding timely write-
downs, delaying LLP, and reclassifying AFS securities as held-to-maturity instruments when 
fair values dropped below amortised costs (Huizinga and Laeven, 2012).  
Column 3 indicates that failed banks set significantly larger provisions than non-failed banks 
or downwards managed earnings before failing. Whereas over-provisioning suggests capital 
management by bolstering loan loss reserves, for failed banks aggressive downwards EM 
infers taking a big bath (Barth et al., 2017) following increased regulatory scrutiny (Rosner, 
2003). Downwards EM is consistent with incumbent banks choosing to appear less profitable 
to deter new entrants and avoid increases in market competitiveness (Tomy, 2019), and to 
deter takeovers and management buyouts by understating earnings to produce lower firm 
valuations (De Angelo, 1988). 
We repeat our analysis using an alternative indicator of bank failure (see Wheelock and 
Wilson, 2000). Acquisition equals unity for 2,870 banks acquired without government 
assistance, zero otherwise. The results from re-estimating equation [2] are consistent with 
previous in terms of significance though their economic importance is considerably lower (see 
Table 2).      
Conclusion 
Our analysis of EM around bank failures indicates that failing banks engage in EM to a 
significantly greater extent than non-failing banks. Our results show that failing banks’ 
discretion over loan loss provisions ranges from aggressive (upwards EM) to conservative 
(downwards EM). The results should interest bank regulators and could inform bank 
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Table 1. Coefficients from Estimations of Equation [2] 






    
Fail 0.181*** -0.165*** 0.182*** 
 (10.884) (-6.700) (8.428) 
Loss 0.255*** -0.093*** 0.376*** 
 (65.143) (-22.094) (63.458) 
LLPt-1 0.079*** -0.077*** 0.077*** 
 (35.671) (-27.500) (25.801) 
EBELT 0.032*** -0.027*** 0.038*** 
 (23.639) (-17.138) (16.893) 
Capitalt-1 0.002*** -0.000 0.004*** 
 (5.983) (-0.371) (8.954) 
Size -0.001 -0.002*** -0.006*** 
 (-1.204) (-3.609) (-7.142) 
ROAt-1 -0.019*** 0.040*** 0.001 
 (-11.576) (20.694) (0.570) 
BHC -0.006*** 0.001 -0.011*** 
 (-3.755) (0.337) (-4.680) 
S&L Crisis 0.042*** -0.047*** 0.037*** 
 (6.280) (-5.406) (3.424) 
GFC -0.089** 0.114* -0.081 
 (-2.067) (1.676) (-1.327) 
Gubernatorial Elections -0.004*** 0.002 -0.006*** 
 (-3.528) (1.625) (-3.454) 
US Unemploymentt-1 0.023 -0.023 0.014 
 (0.418) (-0.272) (0.173) 
ΔGDPt-1 -0.015*** 0.019*** -0.015*** 
 (-3.758) (3.121) (-2.577) 
Constant 0.079*** -0.077*** 0.077*** 
 (35.671) (-27.500) (25.801) 
    
Observations 257,881 146,678 111,203 
R-squared 0.222 0.187 0.277 
Year Controls YES YES YES 





Table 2. Coefficients from Estimations of Equation [2] with Alternative Indicator of Fail 






    
Acquisition 0.015*** -0.011** 0.022*** 
 (3.185) (-2.131) (2.752) 
Loss 0.261*** -0.098*** 0.382*** 
 (66.828) (-23.354) (64.580) 
LLPt-1 0.081*** -0.078*** 0.081*** 
 (37.116) (-27.935) (27.290) 
EBELT 0.031*** -0.027*** 0.036*** 
 (22.845) (-16.913) (16.028) 
Capitalt-1 0.002*** -0.000 0.004*** 
 (5.485) (-0.022) (8.441) 
Size -0.001 -0.002*** -0.006*** 
 (-1.085) (-3.550) (-6.964) 
ROAt-1 -0.019*** 0.041*** 0.002 
 (-11.632) (20.884) (0.650) 
BHC -0.006*** 0.001 -0.011*** 
 (-3.911) (0.470) (-4.814) 
S&L Crisis 0.043*** -0.047*** 0.040*** 
 (6.446) (-5.425) (3.613) 
GFC -0.105** 0.122* -0.108* 
 (-2.433) (1.791) (-1.760) 
Gubernatorial Elections -0.005*** 0.002** -0.008*** 
 (-4.426) (1.961) (-4.286) 
US Unemploymentt-1 0.042 -0.034 0.044 
 (0.758) (-0.400) (0.548) 
ΔGDPt-1 -0.016*** 0.020*** -0.017*** 
 (-4.078) (3.206) (-2.963) 
Constant 0.081*** -0.078*** 0.081*** 
 (37.116) (-27.935) (27.290) 
    
Observations 257,881 146,678 111,203 
R-squared 0.219 0.185 0.274 
Year Controls YES YES YES 
Note: *** and ** indicate significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels. 
  
Figure 1: Distributions of ALLP Obtained from Equation [1] 
 
 
